

## Message Text

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R 100330Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3312

INFO/RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 191

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 4439

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PFOR, AF

SUBJECT: THE AFGHAN REPUBLIC ON THE EVE OF ITS 2ND ANNIVERSARY

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: JULY 17,1975 IS "JESHYN", THE DAY AFGHANISTAN CELEBRATES TWO YEARS UNDER THE REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED BY MOHAMMAD DAOUD. ONCE AGAIN THERE IS HEIGHTENED SPECULATION THAT THE TIME HAS ARRIVED FOR DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENTS: A NEW CONSTITUTION, A NEW PARTY AND A NEW CABINET. YET ON THIS "MJESHYN" EVE PROBABLY THERE IS NO ONE SO CLOSE TO THE MIND OF THE PRESIDENT THAT HE COULD STATE WITH FINALITY THAT ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE EVENTS WILL OR WILL NOT TAKE PLACE. DAOUD HOLDS HIS CARDS CLOSE. HE CALLS THE SHOTS. IN HIS TWO YEARS  
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OF POWER DAOUD HAS TOTALLY REDUCED EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO

HIS CONTROL, AND SLOWLY BROUGHT ALL LEVERS OF POWER INTO HIS OWN AUSTERE OFFICE. HE HAS NOT HOWEVER MOBILIZED AFGHANISTAN'S LIMITED SUPPLY OF MEN TRAINED TO MANAGE A MODERN ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMY, BUT ON THE CONTRARY APPEARS TO HAVE USED PERSONS OFTEN OF DUBIOUS COMPETENCE, ALBEIT OF PROVEN LOYALTY. HIS GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE DESCRIBED AS TECHNICALLY ABLE, AND MANY OF ITS DECISIONS HAVE HAD DELETERIOUS EFFECTS UPON BUSINESS AND THE ECONOMY, WHICH HAVE BEEN ONLY PROSPERECTIVELY COMPENSATED BY FOREIGN AID COMMITMENTS HIS COUNTRY'S DIPLOMACY HAS NETTED. DESPITE THIS, DAOUD RETAINS LEGITIMACY AS LEADER FOR THAT VAST SEGMENT OF AFGHAN SOCIETY WHOSE EXPECTATIONS DERIVE MORE FROM TRADITION THAN FROM PERCEPTIONS OF THE "MODERN" WORLD.

DAOUD'S DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL AT ACHIEVING CLOSER AND MORE FRIENDLY TIES WITH MOST COUNTRIES. NOTABLE AMONG THESE ARE IRAN AND OIL RICH ARAB STATES, WHOSE FINANCIAL AID ALONG WITH THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OFFERS CHANCES OF REAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE SHOWN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WHILE CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED IN POINTS OF CONTACT, ARE GOOD.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, VEXED FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA BY DAOUD'S HARD LINE ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE, APPEAR TO HAVE STABILIZED FOR THE TIME BEING. YET DAOUD'S "FRATERNAL" EFFORTS IN BEHALF OF PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS CANNOT BE TERMED SUCCESSFUL, AT LEAST FROM THE AFGHAN VIEW. END SUMMARY.

2. THE REGIME. DURING HIS TWO YEARS IN POWER DAOUD HAS MOVED STEADILY TO ENHANCE HIS CONTROL, AND THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT THE COMPLETENESS OF HIS GRIP UPON ALL EXISTING LEVERS OF GOVERNMENT POWER: THE MILITARY, THE POLICE, THE BUREAUCRACY. RUMORS EMERGE FROM TIME TO TIME THAT A DIVISION EXISTS AMONG THOSE CLOSEST TO DAOUD, RUNNING ALONG A FRACTURE LINE ON ONE SIDE OF WHICH ARE "THE LEFTISTS" AND, ON THE OTHER, PERSONS WHO FEAR THE REGIME IS RUNNING TOO CLOSE TO THE MARXIST LINE. YET OTHER RUMORS COMING THROUGH THE THICK CURTAIN OF SECRECY IN WHICH DELIBERATIONS OF THE REGIME TAKE PLACE INDICATE THAT DAOUD HIMSELF MONITORS THIS DISSENT, CONFIDENTIAL

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TOLERATING OUTBURSTS WHICH HAVE A PUNISHING EFFECT UPON ONE SIDE BY ANOTHER. THOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW THE TRUTH OF THESE STORIES, THEY GAIN CREDIBILITY WHEN MEASURED AGAINST WHAT EMERGES AFTER TWO YEARS AS PRINCIPAL TOOLS OF DAOUD'S CONTROL: USE OF RIVALRY, UNCERTAINTY AND FEAR TO REDUCE THE STATUS OF ANY WOULD-BE CHALLENGE TO HIS AUTHORITY. SO FAR THIS SEEMS TO BE WORKING. NO CHALLENGER APPEARS IN THE WINGS.

THE BASIS OF THE REGIME REMAINS DAOUD HIMSELF. TALK OF A NEW CONSTITUTION, A NEW POLITICAL PARTY, AND A NEW CABINET, REMAINS ON THIS EVE OF THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY MERELY SPECULATION. IF DAOUD FAILS TO TAKE THIS "JESHYN" OPPORTUNITY FOR AT LEAST SOME DRAMATIC MOVE TOWARD REGULARIZATION OF HIS REGIME IT WILL NOT BE SURPRISING BECAUSE DRAMA IS NOT HIS STYLE.

IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO DISCOUNT COMPLETELY AS A FACTOR OF DAOUD'S POLITICAL CONTROL THAT VAST AND STRATEGICALLY PLACED CLAN FROM WHICH HE COMES, THE MOHAMMADZAI. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SHARPLY REDUCED HIS PUBLIC RELIANCE ON CLAN CONNECTIONS AND APPEARS IN FACT TO SEEK HIS STATUS AND CONTROL COMPLETELY APART FROM THEM, THE FACT REMAINS THAT HIS MANY AND INTRICATE CONNECTIONS, INCLUDING WITH THE FORMER KING'S FAMILY ITSELF, FORM A CUSHION UPON WHICH HE CAN RELY. DAOUD DOES NOT PUSH THE FORTUNES OF HIS FAMILY, BUT NEITHER HAS HE DISPOSSESSED THEM FROM THEIR INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS IN DIPLOMACY AND THE MINISTRIES. HE CAN COUNT ON THEIR SUPPORT, THOUGH THIS MAY BE AS PASSIVE AS HIS OWN CONDUCT TOWARD CLAN MEMBERS.

3. POLITICS OF HOW THINGS GET DONE: THE WORKING OF POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE NEVER BEEN INSTITUTIONALIZED TO THE POINT THAT NEEDS AND GRIEVANCES OF GROUPS OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED CHIEFLY THROUGH SUCH INSTRUMENTS AS A PARLIAMENT, A CABINET OR EVEN AN INFORMAL NETWORK OF COURTIER. BUT IN- SO FAR AS THIS WAS A PROCESS BEFORE THE COUP, IT NO LONGER EXISTS. DURING DAOUD'S TWO YEARS IN POWER, HE HAS TAKEN THE POLITICS OF DEALING WITH INTEREST GROUPS INTO HIS OWN HANDS.

TO BE SURE, AN INFLUENCE BROKERAGE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS STILL EXISTS. AFGHANS FOR THE MOST PART

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CONTINUE TO OBTAIN JOBS, DRIVER'S LICENSES, PLACES IN THE MILITARY AND POLICE ACADEMIES, WHATEVER, BY APPLYING TO SOME RELATION OR OTHER PERSONAL CONNECTION WITH ACCESS AND INFLUENCE. BUT RULES AND CONDITIONS ARE CHANGING: FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING FOUND "CORRUPT" INHIBITS THE FREEDOM OFFICIALS FORMERLY HAD IN THESE AREAS; THE PRICE OF ACCESS TO THE BUREAUCRACY HAS RISEN; AND GOVERNMENT, TO ITS CREDIT, APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING TO APPLY MERIT CRITERIA TO SUCH AREAS AS HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSION, AND OVERSEAS STUDY.

OUTSIDE SMALL TIME INFLUENCE BROKERAGE ALL IMPORTANT LINES LEAD TO DAOUD HIMSELF. THERE ARE STILL NO PERSONS OR IMMEDIATE POSITIONS WITH POWER OF THEIR OWN (OR EVEN DELEGATED POWER, FOR THAT MATTER) TO SATISFY THE COLLECTIVE NEEDS OF

BUSINESSMEN, FARMERS, OR ANY OTHER GROUP EXCEPT, POSSIBLY, THE MOHAMMADZAI CLAN ITSELF. BECAUSE ONLY PRESSING AND IMPORTANT GRIEVANCE BUSINESS IS BROUGHT TO DAOUD IT IS NOT EASY FOR ALL GROUPS TO

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OBTAIN REDRESS, ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS THAT REASONABLE MEN WHO DO GAIN ACCESS TO HIM CAN OBTAIN THAT SWIFT AND DRAMATIC SATISFACTION POSSIBLE ONLY IN AN AUTOCRACY.

4. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE BUREAUCRACY. IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENT DAOUD'S REGIME HAS DESTROYED A HEALTHY AND COMPETENT BUREAUCRACY, OR THAT DAOUD'S REGIME WAS THE FIRST TO DISPOSSESS WHOLESALE GROUPS OF PUBLIC SERVANTS. YET AT THE END OF TWO YEARS IT APPEARS THAT DAOUD'S DECIMATION OF TALENT WITHIN HIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN DELIBER-

ATE AND THAT (UNLIKE PREVIOUS REGIMES) HE HAS NOT SO MUCH REPLACED MEN AS HE HAS SACKED OFFICIALS AND THEN LEFT THEIR PLACES VACANT: MISSING FROM THE CABINET ALTOGETHER ARE A MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS AND A CONFIDENTIAL

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MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS. PROFESSOR ABDUL KAYUM WAS ASSIGNED AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION YET NEVER ACTUALLY DETACHED FROM HIS POST AT MINES AND INDUSTRIES, WHERE HE IS PRESENTLY REFERRED TO AS "CARETAKER MINISTER." MANY WHO RODE TO POWER IN DAOUD'S 1975 COUP D'ETAT REMAIN IN OFFICE REGARDLESS OF COMPETENCE OR LACK OF IT. FEW TOP OFFICIALS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN FOR DEMONSTRATED ABILITY. MANY AMBASSADORS, GOVERNORS AND CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE OLDTIME FRIENDS OF DAOUD, MANY OF WHOM, UNLIKE THEIR MENTOR, ARE WORN OUT AND WELL PAST THEIR PRIME.

THERE IS STILL NO FULLY ACCREDITED AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, A KEY POSITION CONSIDERING AFGHANISTAN'S ORDER OF DIPLOMATIC PRIORITIES. A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF THIRD AND FOURTH ECHELON POSTS ARE SIMPLY "VACANT." THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE CAN BE DESCRIBED AS "GUTTED"; AT MINES AND INDUSTRIES UNCERTAINTIES AND SWITCHED SIGNALS HAVE CREATED A SLOW, OVERLY CAUTIOUS STAFF; THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY BOGGED DOWN. AT FOREIGN AFFAIRS. FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE NO IDEA ABOUT THE DURATIONS OF THEIR CURRENT ASSIGNMENTS OR THEIR PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ASSIGNMENT, FOR ALL PREVIOUSLY EXISTING PATTERNS HAVE BEEN TORN.

ALL THIS MAY WELL BE A PLANNED MANEUVER, ONE HAVING ITS ORIGINS IN DAOUD'S EARLIER PESSIMISTIC OBSERVATIONS OF AFGHAN ADMINISTRATION AND CHARACTER. BUT, AT THE END OF TWO YEARS AND STILL WITH NO INDICATION THAT GOVERNMENT WILL BE STAFFED WITH BUREAUCRATIC ACHIEVEMENT IN MIND, IT BECOMES QUESTIONABLE FOR HOW LONG GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION CAN TOLERATE SUCH PERVASIVE PERSONNEL DEFICIENCIES WITHOUT SERIOUS EFFECTS ON ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

5. BUSINESS AND THE ECONOMY. THE STATE OF THE AFGHAN ECONOMY UNDER THE DAOUD REGIME IS AS SLUGGISH AND FALTERING AS UNDER PREVIOUS REGIMES, DUE IN LARGE PART TO, A) AN UNDEFINED CONCEPT OF A GUIDED ECONOMY ENUNCIATED BY PRESIDENT DAOUD, B) A BUMBLING, INEFFICIENT CONFIDENTIAL

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BUREAUCRACY WHICH PROMULGATES ECONOMIC DECREES, SUCH AS THE BANK AND INSURANCE NATIONALIZATION DECREES, BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN THOUGHT OUT, AND C) THE GOVERNMENT'S BASIC DISTRUST OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND A CONCOMITANT DESIRE TO IMPOSE INCREASINGLY HARSH ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AGAINST FREE ENTERPRISE.

THE HARSH EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE HAVE BEEN TEMPERED TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE BY AN EXCELLENT AGRICULTURAL YEAR. BECAUSE OF GOOD WEATHER, AFGHANISTAN'S AGRARIAN SECTOR SHOULD HAVE A BANNER YEAR WITH GREATLY REDUCED IMPORTS OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS.

WHILE NEW PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND INITIATIVE ARE STIFLED FOR THE REASON CITED ABOVE, REPORTS OF NATURAL GAS AND OF TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS SUCH AS KARAKUL, CARPETS, AND FRUITS CONTINUE TO FLOURISH, HELPING TO BALANCE AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN TRADE AND RESULTING IN A SMALL SURPLUS IN THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION IN THE LAST AFGHAN YEAR. (ENDING MARCH 20, 1975). THUS FAR, AFGHANISTAN'S INFLATION CONTROL RECORD, COMPARED WITH MOST COUNTRIES, HAS BEEN EXCELLENT DUE TO LARGE PART OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED PRICES FOR KEY BASIC COMMODITIES AND THE ECONOMY'S VIRTUAL ISOLATION FROM WORLD ECONOMIC CURRENTS THROUGH ITS NETWORK OF BARTER AGREEMENTS WITH NON-FREE MARKET ECONOMICS.

A KEY QUESTION FOR THE ECONOMY'S FUTURE IS, WILL THE GOVERNMENT BE ABLE TO MAKE EFFICIENT AND PROMPT USE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL AID OFFERED BY THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, NOTABLY IRAN? THIS AGAIN IMPLIES NOT ONLY THE DAOUD REIME'S WILL, BUT ITS ABILITY TO ORGANIZE AND MANAGE SUCH (FOR AFGHANISTAN) VAST SUMS OF NEW ASSISTANCE. WHILE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION, THE GOA IS MOVING AHEAD SLOWLY. IF AND WHEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS EMANATE FROM THIS AID, THERE COULD BE CONSIDERABLE SPIN-OFF FOR THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE IN THE FORM OF NEW JOBS AND MONEY ENTERING THE MORE MODERNIZED SECTOR OF THE COUNTRY.

6. FOREIGN RELATIONS. TRUE TO HIS FIRST PRONOUNCEMENTS UPON TAKING OFFICE, DAOUD'S DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN ONE OF FRIENDSHIP TOWARD ALL, WITH THE SINGLE EXCEPTION OF THAT AREA WHERE PROBLEMS HAVE LONG EXISTED: PAKISTAN, AND THE VEXED QUESTION OF PUSHTUNISTAN. EVEN WHERE THIS ISSUE IS CONFIDENTIAL

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CONCERNED THERE IS RECENT EVIDENCE THAT DAOUD INTENDS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION. IF ANYTHING TO AFGHAN TERMS THE PRESIDENT STANDS FURTHER FROM HIS PROFESSED GOAL OF INSURING THE RIGHTS OF PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS IN NEIGHBORING AREAS

OF PAKISTAN, FOR THE EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 1975 (THE SHERPAO ASSASSINATION AND ITS AFTERMATH) END IN AN ENORMOUS SETBACK FOR PAKISTAN'S ONE PARTY (THE NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY, N.A.P.) WHOSE GOALS ARE SIMILAR TO THE PROFESSED DESIRES OF

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

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INFO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

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AMEMBASSY NEW DLHI

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THE DAOUD REGIME. YET, PRESIDENT DAOUD WAS WILLING JUST A MONTH BEFORE "JESHYN" TO ARRIVE AT A SECRET AGREEMENT WITH THE PAKISTANIS TMPUT LIMITS ON PROPAGANDA. IT APPEARS THAT DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS AFGHANISTAN'S QUARREL WITH PAKISTAN BECAME AS HOT AS DAOUD WISHES IT TO BE, AND THAT HAVING EXPERIENCED THIS HE WILL MAINTAIN SUCH CONTROL IN THE FUTURE AS TO INSURE THAT THIS POINT IS NOT EXCEEDED. THIS STABILITY COULD, OF COURSE, BE INTERPRETED BY SOME OUTSIDE EVENT WHICH COULD HARDEN AFGHAN ATTITUDES, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD THE PAKISTAN SUPREME COURT RENDER A NOTABLY TOUGH DECISION CE ITS PRESENT CONSIDERATION OF THE N.A.P. CASE.

TWO YEARS AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT WHICH BROUGHT DAOUD TO POWER  
IT SEEMS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT OUR OWN, UNITED STATES,  
INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BE PRESERVED UNDER HIS LEADER-  
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SHIP. THERE HAVE BEEN VACILLATIONS AS ONE OR ANOTHER OF THOSE  
WHO RODE TO POWER WITH DAOUD FLEXED MARXIST WINGS. BUT THIS  
WAS AT THE BEGINNING, BEFORE DAOUD HAD GAINED THE NEAR  
TOTALITY OF CONTROL WHICH CHARACTERIZES HIS REGIME TODAY.  
INCREASINGLY, AS DAOUD FINDS HIMSELF MORE AND MORE IN CONTROL,  
HE DEMONSTRATES GREATER PREFERENCE FOR AND EVEN RELIANCE UPON  
THE UNITED STATES. AMONG SIGNALS TO THIS EFFECT WAS AFGHAN  
WARMTH IN KABUL CELEBRATIONS OF FOURTH OF JULY, 1975, WHICH  
WITHOUT DOUBT REPRESENTED POLICY DECISION AS WELL AS RENEWED  
WARMTH OF INDIVIDUAL FEELING. DAOUD, A TOUGH, WILY PRAGMATIST  
WHOSE SENSE OF AFGHAN HISTORY IS SO CLEARLY IDENT-  
IFIED WITH THAT OF HIS OWN CLAN, SHOWS LITTLE INCLINATION  
TO LET THE SOVIETS OR COMMUNISTS, HOME GROWN OR IMPORTED,  
GRAZE BEYOND THE FAIRLY WIDE PASTURE OF INFLUENCE HE HAS  
GRANTED THEM ALREADY. DAOUD IS A NATIONALIST; HE WILL NOT  
MOVE TOO FAR IN ANY DIRECTION. ALTHOUGH LIMITED, US COUNSEL  
WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A PLACE IN AFGHAN DELIBERATIONS, THE US,  
WITH ITS SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, WILL CONTINUE TO  
HAVE A ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND AMER-  
ICAN BUSINESS WILL HAVE ACCESS TO AFGHAN MARKETS.

7. MORALE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE STATE OF MIND OF THE  
AFGHAN BODY POLITIC. IN ALL THIS COUNTRY'S DIVERSITY AND  
GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD THERE MAY BE NO SINGLE NATIONAL CONSENSUS  
CONCERNING THE REPUBLICAN REGIME. WE SPECULATE NEVERTH-  
ELESS, AND DESPITE MUCH WRITTEN IN EARLIER PARAGRAPHS THAT  
MIGHT LEAD TO OPPOSITE CONCLUSIONS, THAT DAOUD IS COMMONLY  
ACCEPTED BY AFGHANS AS A WISE AND VALUABLE LEADER WHOSE  
REGIME IS LEGITIMATE.

AFGHANS FEEL, INCLUDING THOSE WHO DISLIKE DAOUD'S AUTOCRATIC  
RULE, THAT HE HAS ADDED A SENSE OF WILL AND PURPOSE WHICH  
WAS LACKING FROM THE FORMER REGIME. THOUGH PROMINENT AFGHANS  
WHO FIND THEMSELVES EXCLUDED FROM POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP  
GROW INCREASINGLY CYNICAL ABOUT DAOUD'S INTENTIONS, AS TIME  
AND OPPORTUNITIES PASS FOR PROMULGATING A NEW CONSTITUTION  
AND PROVIDING FOR OTHER MEANS OF BROADER BASED GOVERNMENT,  
THE GREAT MASS OF PEOPLE ACCEPT DAOUD'S FIRM LEADERSHIP.  
SOMEONE IS IN CHARGE.

DAOUD'S IMAGE IS THAT OF THE TOUGH, FEARLESS, OMNISCIANT, WISE  
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FATHER, FAMILIAR IN HIS PECULIARLY AFGHAN INTEGRITY AND HOME-LINESS. WHATEVER PAKISTAN RADIO AND DOMESTIC ENEMIES MAY SAY OF HIM, DAOUD IS A GOOD MOSLEM IN THIS LAND OF GOOD MOSLEMS, NEITHER OF THE AUSTERE AND LEGALISTIC KIND, NOR OF THE MYSTIC "DARWISH" VARIETY -- BUT RATHER A PRAGMATICALLY MODERN, PRACTICING, BELIEVING MOSLEM WHOSE BRAND OF ISLAM IS ACCEPTABLE TO TODAY'S AFGHANISTAN. HE CAN SUPPORT THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN, EDUCATIONAL REFORM, AND MANY OTHER KINDS OF MODERNIZATION WITHOUT FEAR OF TAINT, FOR HIS DREAMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF MASSES OF PEOPLE. HIS HAND IS NO HEAVIER THAN MANY OF THOSE BEFORE HIM, NOR IS IT PERCEIVED MORE HEAVY THAN HIS NATION'S TRADITION OF UNRESTRAINED FRACTIONOUSNESS REQUIRES SIMPLY TO KEEP ORDER. HIS HABITS ARE AS AUSTERE AND HIS REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AS GREAT AS HIS CLAN IS DISTINGUISHED AND INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH THE FATE OF AFGHANISTAN. HE IS NOT A MAN OF THE PEOPLE, BUT HE IS BELIEVED BY MANY TO BE A MAN FOR THEM.

THOSE DISCOMFITED BY THE INEPTITUDE OF DAOUD'S OFFICIALS, BY HIS UNDISTINGUISHED CABINET, AND BY THE FECKLESS WAY IN WHICH LEGISLATION IS MADE, ARE BUT A TINY SLIVER OF AFGHANISTAN...THIS SLIVER IS ITSELF A MEASURE OF HOW LITTLE OF THIS COUNTRY EXISTS UNDER THE AEGIS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT OR BUSINESS. AND EVEN SOME IN THIS SLIVER ADMIT THAT THE WILL TO MODERNIZE EXISTS IN THE MIND OF THE PRESIDENT WHEREAS IT WAS NOT IN THE KING'S. THE NATION'S PRIMITIVE ECONOMY AND ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TWO YEARS AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF A "REPUBLIC" TO PLOD AT A PACE SATISFACTORY TO A PUBLIC WHOSE EXPECTATIONS ARE MORE TIED TO TRADITION THAN TO EPHEMERAL NOTIONS OF RAPID "PROGRESS."

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## Message Attributes

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